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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah
Court of Appeals.

2LARATION OF RIGHTS AS A PROP
FREE AND NATURAL PERSON

claiming his rights to less stringent standards than those actions in formal appeals by
lawyers or attorneys. Since many of the issues

irgumer

uenueu

portions of the arguments on one issue be used as additional support for one or more
arguments on other issues.

the CA will accept i

arguments even though they are "broader than the questions".

Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 25, 26 and 27.)

In Propria Persona

1

jpellant's

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a judgement of Case No. 87-200-5384 in the Layton Circuit
Court, Layton, Utah, for violation of U.C.A. 41-6-46 (1953).
The trial was held on April 22, 1988, with Judge K. Roger Bean, presiding. The
sentencing hearing was held on April 26, 1988.
A second trial, and a part of this appeal, was held on May 13, 1988 pertaining to
a Contempt of Court charge made against the Defendant/Appellant during the Precinct
Court trial on this matter. Judge Bean again presided. Judge John Stewart was the
complaining judge. Defendant/Appellant was found guilty and here appeals that finding
and that proceeding.
The Notice and Demand for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal and the Notice of
Appeal on the first trial were filed on April 26, 1988.
The Notice of Appeal on the Contempt of Court charge was filed on June 1,1988.
The case concerns a speeding citation for traveling 65 mph in a posted 55 mph
zone. This was a second citation given to the Defendant by the same officer some 30
days after the Precinct Court trial on the first case.
In this case, as in the first case, the officer avoided the questions in crossexamination that would have put the facts before the court. Instead, the officer answered
with prejudicial and accusatory remarks against the Defendant. The officer made written
prejudicial, false, immaterial and irrelevant statements on the back of the citation.
The Appellant Citizen claims his right to travel unmolested has been violated. That
there was no crime, damage, loss, injury, trespass, intent or threat to harm any person
or property.
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The Appellant made only "Dilatory" pleas before the courts and appeared specially
and not generally on all occasions, demanded his rights at all times and not waiving any
of his rights at any time, including his right to time. The purpose of the dilatory pleas was
not to delay, but to deny jurisdiction to the court in this instant matter. To plea otherwise
would have been construed as accepting the lower court's jurisdiction.
The Appellant could not afford an attorney and was required to resist the false
charges, his government and the Star Chamber Court in Propria Persona.
The Appellant believes that he travels the public highways as a matter of right and
objects to his status being reduced to that of a corporate creature created by the State,
which uses the public highways as a matter of privilege and is subject civilly and criminally
to every whim of the police power and it's creator, the State.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is the "right to travel" a right "granted" Citizens by the State and Federal

Constitutions as stated in Salina v. Wisden, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1987), or is the right of
a Citizen to travel a fundamental, inalienable right "guaranteed" by those constitutions?
2.

Does the possession of a State Drivers License by a Citizen pursuant to by

U.C.A. 41-2-104 (1953 as amended) relegate "The right of a Citizen to travel upon the
public highways and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and
business" and "a common right which he has under right to enjoy life and liberty,"
Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583, (1930), free from license, tax or fee's; thus
converting the citizen's right under the Fifth and Ninth to the Federal Constitution to the
same status as that of a corporate creature or juristic person who is subject to it's
creator's every whim and must hire professional, licensed "Drivers" in order to travel upon
the public highways and then may do so only as a matter of privilege?
3.

Does Article III, Section 2, Clauses 1 and 2 of the U.S. Constitution require

that the U.S. Supreme Court have original jurisdiction in controversies between states and
Citizens of any state, are the "People of the State" the injured party when a criminal act
is committed, and are the "People of the State" alleged to be injured and held to be
victims when a Citizen merely exceeds a certain speed and harms no one by doing so?
4.

Recognizing that in the event of an injury, damage, loss or trespass, he may

be held accountable for the damage; does a State Citizen have the right to travel the
public highways in a safe and prudent manner even if he exceeds an arbitrarily assigned
posted speed limit?
5.

Does a State Citizen have the right to travel the public highways in a safe

and prudent manner when he does not exceed the 85th percentile speed of the traffic as
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measured by an engineering and traffic investigation in accordance with U.C.A. 41-6-47
(1953 as amended)?
6.

Can a Citizen be charged with, and found guilty of a "crime," merely by

traveling at a speed greater than posted, and absent conclusive evidence that his speed
alone was unreasonable and imprudent?
7.

Does a State Citizen commit a crime and/or is there a cause of action if

while exercising his right to travel on a public highway he exceeds the posted speed limit,
but he does no damage, causes no injury, commits no trespass, causes no hazard,
makes no threat to another person or property, has no specific intent and no injured
person signs a complaint?
8.

Was the Defendant deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed right of

confronting his accuser when the courts below refused to allow the Defendant to
introduce impeaching evidence of prior inconsistent statements, false swearing, perjury
and prejudice on the part of the accuser and only witness?
9.

Was the Defendant denied Due Process when the arresting officer wrote

immaterial and irrelevant prejudicial statements on the complaint and because the court
below received that prejudicial, immaterial and irrelevant statements into evidence?
10.

Was the Defendant denied Due Process and his constitutionally guaranteed

right under the Sixth Amendment, to confront and cross-examine his accuser, when the
court below denied Defendant his Right of Discovery of the officer's notes made at the
scene of the arrest-made at the moment of the issuance of the citation by the arresting
officer while "in the line of duty" and while on duty?
11.

Was defendant denied his right to Due Process and his constitutionally

guaranteed right to confront and cross-examine his accuser when, representing himself
in Propria Persona, the court below would not sustain his objections to the inappropriate,
5

unresponsive and flippant answers on the part of the accusing officer, and the court was
generally intolerant and unresponsive to Defendant's requests for help in ascertaining the
truth from the State's principle and only witness?
12.

Was Defendant, acting in Propria Persona, denied Due Process and a

constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial, when he demanded that the officer answer
his questions and the court refused to compel the officer to answer, then found the
Defendant guilty of Contempt of Court for making that demand of the officer?
13.

Was the Defendant denied Due Process and his constitutionally guaranteed

right to confront and cross-examine his accuser when two of the three material witnesses,
who are employees of the State, failed to obey lawful subpoenas to appear at the trial and
another, who did appear, failed to bring documents requested in "subpoena duces tecum"
which were material to the Defendant's defense, and when requested, the court below
refused to compel their appearance, hold them in contempt, or postpone the trial?
14.

Can the Defendant be made to pay witness fees to a witness who is a State

employee and called during business hours which requirement to so pay was ordered by
the judge and requested by the prosecutor, or is U.C.A. 21-5-15 (1953 as amended) still
in effect?
15.

Should the Defendant be compelled to pay fees to witnesses in a criminal

contempt trial, when those called were witnesses to the fact, or is U.C.A. 21-5-14 (1953
as amended) in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights in the Constitution of
Utah and of the United States?
16.

Was the Defendant denied Due Process when the court below denied his

request for "rights sua sponte"?
17.

Was the Defendant denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial

by an "impartial jury of his peers," concerning his right to "voir dire" his jury, when the
6

court denied the Defendant the right to personally ask the prospective jurors questions
necessary to determine whether they were indeed impartial or whether they were, in fact,
prejudiced against the Defendant, and if they were, in fact, prejudiced, or became so by
statements by the court; could such jurors be deemed to constitute "a jury of his peers"?
18.

Was Defendant denied Due Process and his constitutionally guaranteed right

by having to pay for the trial transcripts which he could not do thus detrimentally affecting
his right to appeal?
19.

Where an individual, through circumstances beyond his control, has

insufficient income to support himself; cannot find steady work within the State; is supplied
food and lodging by another, and could not possibly save or borrow the funds to pay for
the required trial transcripts; can that individual be deemed as not impecunious, where
that determination was based solely on the mere fact that he "lives in a house and has
access to a motor vehicle," or can only the homeless and beggars be deemed
impecunious pursuant to U.C.A. 21-7-3 (1953 as amended)?

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is quite similar to Case No. 870464-CA with all of the same players
except the judge. The Defendant/Appellant was traveling on U.S. 89, a four-lane, divided
expressway, east of Layton, Utah. The Appellant was stopped by the same Sgt. Owen
Busch of the Utah Highway Patrol. In fact it was only about 30 days after the Precinct
Court trial of the first case. When Officer Busch walked up to the Appellant's car, he said
that he was going to teach the Appellant a lesson. The Appellant attempted to find out
the "probable cause" and if he was in custody. The Appellant was very fearful that the
officer meant to do him harm. The officer told Baker, the Appellant, that he was under
arrest and dragged him from the car. To save himself from further rough handling, the
Appellant showed his Drivers License. The Appellant was then charged with traveling 65
mph in a 55 mph posted area.
It was a beautiful Saturday, about 2 p.m. in the afternoon. There were no other
cars on the two southbound lanes within one-half mile in front or behind us. The little
white sports car (UHP Mustang) had pulled up beside the Appellant, but about 15 feet
behind him in the outside southbound lane, a few hundred feet south of the Hill Field
Road. The UHP vehicle remained in the position of "blind spot" in the right lane for about
20 seconds, then the driver must have applied his brakes and backed off. The Appellant
was in the left lane and prefers to be in right lane so that the other traffic may pass on the
left. The white UHP vehicle had pulled up very fast at the time the Appellant was about
to change to the right lane. The Appellant was unable to observe that the white vehicle
was a UHP Mustang or see it's insignia on the side. The Appellant remembers being
slightly irritated that the white car didn't go on past him so that he could move to the right
lane. A few seconds later, when he checked the right lane, the white car was several
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hundred feet behind, as if he had thrown on his brakes. Without any further ado, the
Appellant moved over to the right lane with his cruise control still set on 62 mph. He did
notice the white car about 400 or 500 feet behind him a couple of times. The odd part
was that there were no other cars near us for at least one-quarter mile. (As a civil
engineer, the Appellant prides himself on judging distances.)
The Appellant was listening to some tapes and in no big hurry, when the red lights
came on.

9

ARGUMENTS
1.

WHERE "TRAVEL" IS AN INALIENABLE RIGHT INHERENT IN ALL STATE

CITIZENS, IT CANNOT BE CLAIMED TO BE A RIGHT "GRANTED" BY ANY
CONSTITUTION, WHERE A CONSTITUTION IS AN ORGANIC ACT OF THE CITIZENS,
AND AS SUCH, THE FULL PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO SECURE AND PROTECT THE
INHERENT RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN IN HIS LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY FROM THE
USURPATION AND OPPRESSION OF HIS GOVERNMENT.
a.

In the recent case of Salina v. Wisden, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1987),
the Supreme Court of Utah appears to have erred where in it was
held that the "right to travel" is a right granted to Citizens by the State
and Federal Constitutions. It is well-settled that constitutions are
organic acts of the people and as such their means do not change.
That which was meant when those constitutions were drafted is meant
today. The original intent of the framers of these documents was
solely to secure and protect the God-given rights inherent in all people
by virtue of their birth and existence in this nation.

As those

constitutions cannot, therefore, "grant" any rights that are endowed
by the creator, can it be claimed by judicial determination that they
can?
While not specifically enumerated in either constitution, it must
be recognized that the inherent "right to travel" is included among the
vast numbers of rights meant to be secured and protected by
operation of the language contained in the Ninth Amendment, and
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further guaranteed by the liberty clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
The Constitution must, by virtue of its very nature, be a
"negative" document, owing to the fact that it is essentially impossible
to enumerate every possible right imaginable that the people wish to
secure to themselves and protect from the encroachment of the
government they created. Conversely, the limited powers that were
deemed necessary to be granted to government were "positive" or
specifically enumerated.
A legislative body cannot claim to have the power to enlarge
upon those powers granted to it by the Constitution since the power
to legislate emanates therefrom and from that authority alone it derives
the power to enact laws. Such laws cannot operate to subrogate or
abrogate any right inherent in the people from birth. The creature of
government cannot exceed its creator-the people.
Inasmuch as the negative cannot be proven, the Court of
Appeals is thought to furnish the Appellant the basis of jurisdiction
claimed by the lower court over his person in the case at bar simply
by citing the Wisden court's determination that the "right to travel" is
a "right granted by the constitutions" both Federal and State, in light
of evidence to the contrary.
"No court in America ever yet thought, nor, I hope, ever will,
of acquiring jurisdiction by fiction...it is evident that we are not
to assume a voluntary jurisdiction, because we think, or others
might think, it may be exercised innocently, or even wisely."
Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. 308, 311, 312, (1797).
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In Saiina v. Wisden, supra., the Utah Supreme Court states: "In order
for our scheme of ordered liberties to succeed, we must obey valid
laws, even those with which we do not agree" id., pg. 3. Do they
mean that the Citizen is required to obey all valid laws whether they
apply to him or not. If the State statute requires a Citizen to have a
license to do something he already has a right to do, is the statute a
valid law when it pertains to the Citizen?
The high court's words "scheme of ordered liberties" indicates
that the personal liberties of the Citizens may be controlled, regulated
and even organized like an army general would train and organize his
troops, or like the legislature can train and regulate their creatures.
This country became the greatest on earth because of the freedoms
and liberties of the people, not because they were regimented by a
"scheme of ordered liberties."
A Citizen is a free and natural person, a sovereign, having and
enjoying all his inalienable, political and civil rights within a country.
Citizen is the term used to describe the highest status obtainable by
an individual in a country. A man's status is his position as a lawful
man. Some individuals have the status of subject, member, public
servant, alien, ward, felon, and many more. Each status lesser than
a Citizen has accepted some privileges or committed some crime
which subjects him to more regulation and restriction within the
society than that of a free citizen. A natural, free person has the
status of a Citizen, not because he is human, but because he has
inalienable rights, immunities, duties and responsibilities ascribed to
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him. If he waives those rights he may have a lower status. The
fictitious persons are the juristic creatures, corporations, etc., who act
as a matter of privilege.
The right of a Citizen to travel is probably best explained in Thompson
v. Smith.
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and
to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life
and business is a common right which he has under right to
enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to
pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing
to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and
under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive
a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an
automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life
and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the moving of a
house in the street, operating a business stand in the street,
which a city may permit or prohibit at will."
Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583, (1930).
According to the following cases and constitutional cites the courts
have no jurisdiction over Citizens unless there is damage, loss, injury,
trespass, intent or threat to harm a person or property, or an injured
person signs a complaint. Sovereignty over government is with the
people.

Sovereignty over the corporations, their drivers and all

regulated industry who organize under the state statues; is with the
State. Corporations are creatures created by the state.
"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system while sovereign
powers are delegated to agencies of government, sovereignty
itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts. And the Law is the definition and
limitation of power." ...of government Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370, (1885). (Underlined words added.)
"The sole object and only legitimate end of government is to
protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property;
and when the government assumes other functions it is
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usurpation and oppression." (Alabama Constitution, Art. I, Sec.
35).
'This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof;---shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding." (U.S. Constitution, Art. VI).
"The words life, liberty and property are constitutional terms
and are to be taken in the broadest sense. They indicate the
three great subdivisions of all civil rights. The term property
in this clause embraces all valuable interests which a man may
possess outside of himself, and that is to say outside of his
life and liberty. It is not confined to mere technical property,
but literally to every species of vested right." Campbell v. Holt,
115 U.S. 620, (1985). (Dissenting opinion.)
"Although the Articles of Confederation provided that the
people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and
from any other state, that right finds no explicit mention in the
Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right
so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a
necessary commitment of the stronger Union the Constitution
created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United
States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, (1908); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160,177 (1941), (concurring opinion), 181
(concurring opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1,6-8; 1216 (1958), (dissenting opinion)." United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 758, (1965).
IN REGARDS TO JURISDICTION OVER THE CITIZEN AND
RECOGNIZING "THERE IS A CLEAR DISTINCTION IN THIS
PARTICULAR BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL AND A CORPORATION...,"
HALEV. HINKLE, SUPRA.; IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ILLEGAL AND
UNLAWFUL TO FORCE THE CITIZEN TO SUBMIT TO THE SAME
LICENSES AND CONTROLS AS THAT OF AN ALIEN, CREATURE OR
JURISTIC PERSON, I.E.; DRIVER'S LICENSE, AUTO REGISTRATION,
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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES, AND POLICE INTERFERENCE IN
THE PRIVATE AND BUSINESS LIVES OF THE CITIZENS.
2.

THE POSSESSION OF A VALID STATE DRIVERS LICENSE BY A CITIZEN

AS REQUIRED BY U.C.A., 41-2-104 (1953 AS AMENDED) APPARENTLY RELEGATES
THE "RIGHT OF A CITIZEN TO TRAVEL UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS AND
TRANSPORT HIS PROPERTY THEREON IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LIFE AND
BUSINESS" AND REQUIRES THE CITIZEN TO WAIVE HIS "COMMON RIGHT WHICH HE
HAS UNDER RIGHT TO ENJOY LIFE AND LIBERTY." THOMPSON V. SMITH, SUPRA. AT
PG. 583. WITHOUT THAT RIGHT THE CITIZEN ASSUMES THE SAME STATUS AS THAT
OF A CORPORATE CREATURE OR JURISTIC PERSON WHO IS SUBJECT TO ITS
CREATOR'S EVERY WHIM OR "SCHEME OF ORDERED LIBERTY." WITHOUT THAT
RIGHT HE MAY BE REGULATED AS IF HE WERE A HIRED PROFESSIONAL, LICENSED
"DRIVER" AND MAY TRAVEL UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS ONLY AS A MATTER OF
PRIVILEGE.
a.

For years the State has lied to and threatened the Citizens by
intimidation and duress to obtain a "Drivers License." The State told
the Citizens that driving on the public highways was a privilege which
could be withdrawn by the State at any time.

Bouvier's Law

Dictionary, 1914 Edition, defines the difference between a Driver and
Traveler.
(1)

Driver: "One employed in conducting a coach, carriage,
wagon, or other vehicle with horses, mules, or other animals."

(2)

Employed: "The act of doing a thing, and being under
contract or orders to do it."

(3)

Traveler: "One who passes from place to place, whether for
pleasure, instruction, business or health."
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When the court refers to a "Driver," hired by contract to move freight
for a profit on the public right-of-way, they know that he is "driving as
a matter of privilege and not as a matter of right."
There are over 80 cases by state Supreme Courts that state: "To
travel is a common right." To stop a Citizen when there has been no
crime, loss or complaint the government must have a civil power or
authority over him. The Organic Law states that before a Territory
can qualify to become a State, it must provide:
"for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious
liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their
laws and constitutions are erected; to fix and establish those
principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions and
governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the
said Territory;" (Section 13, Northwest Territorial Ordinance,
Volume 1, U.S. Code.)
The State has civil jurisdiction over the creatures it created but not the
Citizens who are the author and source of law.
The lower courts are convinced there is no difference between an
individual or Citizen and a corporate creature or juristic person.
A common right may not be taxed, licensed or fee'd and since
the right to travel is a common right for the individual, it is illegal to
require that they carry a license or be taxed for using that right.
The street belongs to the public and are primarily for the use
of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes
of gain is special and extraordinary and generally at least, may
be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper."
Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144, (1923).
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be
converted into a crime." Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489,
(1956).
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"The privilege of using the streets and highways by the
operation thereon of motor carriers for hire can be acquired
only by permission or license from the State or its political
subdivision." (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., page 830.)
"We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this
particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for
an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may
stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled
to carry on his private business in his way. His power to
contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his
neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an
investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes
no duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom,
beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are
such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the
organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by
due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution.
Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the
immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure
except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the
public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is creature of the State.
It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.
It receives certain special privileges and franchises and holds
them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its
charter. Its powers are limited by law." Hale v. Hinkle, 201
U.S. 43, 74, (1906).
d.

When there is no distinction between the personal "Drivers License"
and the "Drivers License" required for the professional driver who is
hired to drive one of the creatures' vehicles; and no difference in the
vehicle license plates, it indicates that we are all in the same class
and have the same status.
If this Citizen has in any way waived any of his rights by
possessing a State "Drivers License," he demands to know about it.
The Appellant recognizes his responsibility to travel in such a way that
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he will not cause harm to anyone and that if he causes harm, he may
be held responsible.
e.

The legislative justification of the Licensing Statute is that of
improving the safety of the highways. Denial of the rights of the
Citizens doesn't improve safety nor does it protect the public
consistent with the purpose of the police power. The responsibility
of the city, county or state to establish traffic rules does two things:
(1) It establishes a standard by which all travelers may use as a guide
to improve the traffic, to flow smoother, faster and at higher volumes,
and (2) in case of an accident it helps the insurance companies and
the courts establish fault. Police power cannot be used to collect
revenue, especially in the name of public safety.

f.

Blackstone states, "Next to personal security, the law of England
regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals.
This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion of changing
situations, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own
inclinations may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by
due course of law (common law)." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (page
42) it says that liberty is "freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing,
and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from
without!"
The following court cases further substantiate the right to travel
freely on the highways of all the States of the United States of
America.
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"Automobiles are LAWFUL means of conveyance, and have
equal rights upon public roads with horses and carriages
...(and) the operator of an automobile and a pedestrian have
reciprocal rights and DUTIES, and although each has the right
to PASS and REPASS, neither must so negligently exercise that
right so as to injure the other." Hennessy v. Taylor, 76 NE 224
(Mass. 1905).
"It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that appellant was guilty
of negligence from merely using an automobile as a means of
conveyance on the public highway. The law does not
denounce motor carriages as such on the public way..."
Indiana Springs v. Brown, 1 LRA NS 238 at 241, (1905).
"...a license is a mere means of regulation...the order in
question was void in singling out automobiles by name, and
placing them under the ban of OUTLAWRY, when, as a matter
of common observation and scientific knowledge there is less
danger in propelling an automobile than there is in driving a
horse and buggy." And "Class legislation discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited." Christy v. Elliot, 216
III. 46, (1905).
"...there is nothing new or exceptional in the principles of law
that apply to their (automobiles) use on the highways...the
owner of an automobile has the SAME RIGHT as the owner of
other vehicles to use the highways or streets of a city...owners
of automobiles have the same rights in the roads and streets
as the drivers of horses." House v. Cramer, 112 NW 3, (1907).
"The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of
national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against State interference.
Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are
only such as arise out of the nature and essential character of
the National Government, or are specifically granted or secured
to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United
States. ...the right of national citizenship is the right to pass
freely from State to State... We are all citizens of the United
States; and as members of the same community, must have
the right to pass and repass through every part of it without
interruption, as freely as in our own States." Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941).
Chief Justice Fuller, in Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 at 274 (1900)
stated:
"Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from
one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of
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personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit FROM
OR THROUGH the territory of any State is a right secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the
Constitution." (See Petition for Remand and Review No. 32.)
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there
can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491, (1966).
IF POSSESSION OF A "DRIVER'S LICENSE" IN ANY WAY
RELEGATES OR REDUCES THE RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN TO THAT
OF A PRIVILEGE, THE PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW IT.
3.

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2, CLAUSE 1 AND 2 OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

STATES CLEARLY THAT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
IN CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES AND CITIZENS OF ANY STATE. WHEN THE
PEOPLE ARE THE VICTIMS OR INJURED PARTY, THE STATE CANNOT BE THE
PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE CITIZEN OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION.
a.

The Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section 2, Clause 1
and 2 states:
'The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States.
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority; ...to controversies between two or more States;
...and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
"In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
consuls and those in which a State shall be a party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." (Underlining
added.)
This case is between a State and a Citizen, it would appear to the
Appellant that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction. This can
easily be shown by simply diagraming either of the two clauses of
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Article III, Section 2 according to any standard method of teaching
English. The case of City of Salina v. Wisden, supra, at pg. 3,
appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah; fails to prove
jurisdiction of the court over this particular case or the Citizen and
cannot effect a remedy.
Salina v. Wisden, supra, at pg. 3 states: "In order for our scheme of
ordered liberties to succeed, we must all obey valid laws, even those
with which we do not agree;" I take it that "valid" means laws
pertaining to the Defendant. It is a valid law that "All aliens must
register at the nearest post office." That may be a valid law for aliens.
"All persons must register for the draft" may be a valid law for those
young men between certain ages, but does it pertain to me? All
drivers must have a "Driver's License" but, does that pertain to
travelers who are traveling as a matter of right?
Valid statutes are those that are not repugnant to the Law: meaning
the Organic Law as found in Volume I of the U.S. Code. Those
statutes that do not have roots in the Organic Law are null and void
per the U.S. Supreme Court. No statutes may violate the Citizen's
inalienable rights or immunities, or they are unconstitutional.
The people can only give to the State power and authority they
have. They cannot give the State authority they don't have. Since
a Citizen has no power or authority to stop another Citizen using the
public Right-of-Way for what it was intended, how could they give that
authority to a government.
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"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not

subject to law, for it is the author and source of law;" Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, supra, at 370.
d.

The state, county and municipalities may, "under its police power,
regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not
arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it." Thompson v. Smith,
supra, at pg. 583. In the higher courts opinion, it is "Search and
Seizure" under the Fourth Amendment when any police officer stops
a "Citizen" and his complaint has no substance, no loss, victim, intent
or there has been no crime committed.
"But whenever the operation and effect of any general
regulation is to extinguish or destroy that by which the law of
the land is the property of any person, so far as it has that
effect; it is considered as being deprivation of property within
the meaning of this Constitutional guarantee if it deprives an
owner of one of its essential attributes, destroys its value,
restricts or interrupts its common, necessary or profitable use,
hampers the owner in the application of it to the purpose of
trade, or imposes conditions upon the right to hold, or use it
and thereby seriously impairs its value." (Constitutional Law,
16 AM JUR. 2d, Const. Law, Section 369.)

e.

There can be no remedy in the court because no person or entity was
injured. To pay anyone, even the State for a loss or damage that
never was is not only not a remedy, it is unlawful and ludicrous. This
is not to say that the State may not tax, fine, bully, or harass the
creatures it created in every way it decides; because the State granted
that privilege to them.

4.

A STATE CITIZEN HAS THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY

IN A SAFE AND PRUDENT MANNER EVEN THOUGH HE EXCEEDS THE ARBITRARILY
ASSIGNED POSTED SPEED LIMIT?
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A State Citizen travels on the public highway as a matter of right.
The Right of Locomotion was the law of the land long before this
State of Utah was organized.
"He owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing
therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His
rights are such as existed by the law of the land long
antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be
taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with
the Constitution.
The individual may stand upon his
constitutional rights as a citizen." Hale v. Hinkle, supra, at pg.
74.
The posted speed limit on the four-lane expressway, with two traffic
lanes going each direction divided by a median varying from 16 ft. to
30 ft. with provisions for left and right lanes, was 55 mph. The
highway (U.S. 89) was posted at 65 mph in 1973 and was designed
for 70 mph traffic with 2,300 vehicles per hour per lane (vehicles 1.5
seconds apart in each lane).
How can the State justify the 55 mph speed limit as being
"reasonable and prudent" when almost 100% of the vehicles on the
road exceed that speed. All travelers and drivers must be acting in
a criminal manner with intent to commit a crime. Is it reasonable for
the State to establish a speed limit that no one will adhere to?
How can the State justify on the basis of public safety a
situation where a police officer traveling at 55 mph can cause a logjam of vehicles around and behind him in just 2 or 3 miles. The traffic
traveling at an unreasonably slow speed causes the vehicles to bunch
up and follow at only 30 or 40 feet behind the vehicles in front of them
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causing a potentially serious condition. A free flowing stream of traffic
is by far the safer condition and every traffic engineer knows it.
c.

U.S.C.A. Title 23 (1973) (West Supp. 1989), Section 154 "National
Maximum Speed Limit" states:
"(a) the Secretary of Transportation shall not approve any
project under Section 106 in any State which (1) a maximum
speed limit on any public highway within its jurisdiction in
excess of fifty-five miles per hour, or (2)...."
By blackmail, duress and coercion, the federal government has
broken through the defenses of the States (Articles IX and X of the
Bill of Rights) and is now coercing the States into harassing their own
Citizens. The State has legislated statutes on the pretense that they
are for the protection of the public, when in reality the only object is
to make the Citizens more subservient and reduce them the same
status as a creature. Our State has happily joined with our federal
government in gaining tighter control over the sheeple. A flock of
sheep are much easier to manage than a bunch of goats or wild
burros that like to go their own way and do their own thing.

d.

Speed limit signs are not substantive law, they are beneficially used
as guides or warnings for up-coming curves, schools or hazards
where the traffic should use extra caution? Today it seems that
"reasonable and prudent" is not what the public does or thinks it is,
but what the police, public servants and the courts think it is.

e.

Among the worst fears for most people is to be stopped by a
policeman and/or be called into court.
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THE CITIZENS HAVE A RIGHT TO TRAVEL THEIR PUBLIC HIGHWAY
WITHOUT FEAR AND HARASSMENT BY OUR POLICE.
5.

U.C.A. 41-6-47 (1953 AS AMENDED) REQUIRES THE UTAH DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION (UDOT), BY MEANS OF AN "ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC
INVESTIGATION," TO DETERMINE A PRIMA FACIE REASONABLE OR SAFE SPEED
FOR OUR PUBLIC HIGHWAYS. THE HIGHWAY IS POSTED AT THE SPEED OF THE
85TH PERCENTILE. (SEE EXHIBIT "E".)
a.

That 85th percentile of the traffic speed on the subject expressway
was established as being 65 mph many years ago and regular
monitoring of the speeds today, with the 55 mph posted speed limit,
there is no change. Apparently there is a 10 mph differential between
the posted speed and what UDOT has found to be "reasonable and
prudent."
What is the object of U.C.A. 41-6-47 (1953 as amended) if the
State, UDOT, the police and the courts completely ignore it? Should
some of the traffic statues be enforced while others are ignored?
How long can the higher courts ignore the rights of the people?
Does it have to go on until Utah becomes a Police State? That isn't
very long because we already are a Police State. Are the higher court
judges willing to enslave their own posterity along with the rest of the
citizenry?

It should be recognized that being a judge is only a

temporary position in life. In that position, you can help the people
to freedom or further enslave them and let the public servants and
lower courts treat them as they will-with disgust and contempt. You
have the temporary power to remedy this situation.
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6.

WHEN THERE ARE NO TRAFFIC HAZARDS, RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS

OR OTHER POSSIBLE INTERFERENCES THAT COULD CAUSE INJURY, HARM OR
TRESPASS ON ANOTHER'S RIGHTS; A CITIZEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL
AT MUCH HIGHER SPEEDS THAT IS NOW RECOGNIZED AS BEING REASONABLE
AND PRUDENT BY THE POLICE, LOWER COURTS AND THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT
FORCED UPON THE STATE'S CITIZENS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
a.

The Appellant attempted to submit several of the following State
Supreme Court cases in his defense and as jury instructions. They
were all denied, mostly because they were cases from other states,
according to the prosecutor.
State v. Trimming is an Idaho case in which the defendant
was convicted in District Court of driving at a speed greater than was
reasonable and prudent.

Idaho Supreme Court reversed the

conviction and Justice Smith wrote the majority opinion:
"[5-7] I.C. Sec. 40-701 does not prohibit the driving in excess
of the limits specified. But if one does so drive, then he must
assume the burden of proving that in so driving he was not
unreasonable or imprudent under the conditions to which the
statute refers. And if his evidence shows that no condition
existed either actual, potential, or at all, which would render his
speed 'greater than is reasonable and prudent' then the burden
of proof, of overcoming the prima facie presumption of
unreasonable and imprudent driving, is fully met. There being
no evidence of unreasonable or imprudent driving 'under the
conditions' then appellant was entitled to acquittal of the charge
of unreasonable and imprudent driving, as a matter of law, the
evidence being insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the
court's finding of unreasonable and imprudent driving 'under
the facts as set forth in said stipulation.'" (Pages 121 and 122)
State v. Trimmings, 406 P. 2d 118 (Idaho, 1965). (Underlining
added.)
In reversing a conviction, the Massachusetts Court, as quoted in State
v. Trimming also said:
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"The real question in all these cases is not whether the speed
is greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to
traffic and the use of the way and the safety of the public, the
burden being on the [State] to show that it was. If the speed
was such as to make out a prima facie case for the
prosecution, still the burden does not change. The jury are to
give due weight to the prima facie case taken in connection
with the other circumstances disclosed by the testimony...and
if they are satisfied that the speed is greater than was
reasonable and proper, having regard to traffic and the use of
the way and the safety of the public, they should convict the
defendant; otherwise they should acquit him. And hence in
some cases a defendant may be convicted even if he has not
exceeded the rate named in the prima facie clauses of the
statute, and in some he may be acquitted even though he may
have exceeded it." (95 N.E. at 215-216, a 1911 case 209 Mass.
24, 95 N.E. 214), State v. Trimmings, 406 P. 2d, 118, (1965).
(Underlining added.)
The Illinois Court, in reversing a judgement of conviction on a charge
of having violated the posted speed limit similar to U.C.A. (1953 as
amended) said:
"...Upon proof of driving at a speed in excess of the posted
speed limits a rebuttable presumption is raised that the statute
has been violated, and this presumption is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case on the part of the State. The
defendant may then introduce evidence to attack the basic fact
upon which the presumption is based, that the defendant was
driving at a speed in excess of the posted speed limits, or the
defendant by his evidence may show that the conditions
existing at the time and place of the arrest with reference to
traffic condition of the roadway, etc., were such that he would
be taken out of the purview of the statute. The State
throughout the case has the duty of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant was driving at a speed in
violation of the specific statutory provisions, and unless the
State sustains that burden there should be a finding of not
guilty. All that the presumption which is raised by a violation
of the posted speed limit does is to create a prima facie case,
and, standing alone and with no conflicting evidence, it would
be sufficient to support a judgement. This presumption fails
when the testimony of the State's witnesses is inconsistent with
the presumption and in its very essence rebuts it." People v.
Perlman, 15 III. App. 2d 239, 145 N.E. 2d 762, (1957).
(Underlining added.)
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The Ohio Court in reversing a judgement of conviction on a charge
laid under the statute, said:
"...merely to operate (a motor vehicle) outside of a municipality
at a speed greater than 50 miles an hour is not a violation of
the law that being only prima facie and the other provisions of
the statute must be met as every person is presumed to be
innocent until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of all the essential elements of the crime charged." State v.
Hale, 109 N.E. 2d 588,590, (Ohio, 1952). (Underlining added.)
The Ohio Court stated in the headnote 185 N.E. 2d at 125:
"...we conclude that the gist of the offense is whether the
speed in question is greater or less than is reasonable and
proper under the conditions specified in Section 4511.21,
supra, and that the particular speeds made prima facie lawful
or unlawful are just what they are called, prima facie evidence
to be considered along with the other evidence in the case in
determining the ultimate question whether the speed is
reasonable and proper." State v. Wall, 115 Ohio App. 323,185
N.E. 2d 115, 125, (1962). (Underlining added.)
In considering the evidence the Court stated:
"... the great weight of the testimony is to the effect that it was
not raining and had not been for several hours; that the road
was dry; that it was wide and, there being no evidence to the
contrary, may be assumed to be satisfactorily smooth; that
there were no crossroads and in the entire three miles only
three roads which dead end into Highway 257; that the speed
traveled was between 55 and 60 miles an hour; that the motor
vehicle was nearly new and in good condition; for which reason
the judgement of conviction must be reversed upon the weight
of the evidence." State v. Wall, id. at pg. 125.
Olinykv. People, 642 P. 2d 490, (Colo. 1981). "The effect of
proof that a driver exceeded a prima facie speed limit is to
raise a rebuttable presumption that the driver's speed
exceeded what was reasonable or prudent under the
circumstances." State v. Rich, 563 P. 2d 918, (Ariz. 1977). "If,
however, the driver's speed is the only evidence submitted by
the prosecution, the defendant submits evidence sufficient to
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, a court may rule
that defendant's speed, while in excess of the posted speed
limit, was legal under the circumstances existing at the time."
State v. Trimmings, 89 Idaho 440, 406 P. 2d 118, (1965).
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"What is a reasonable rate of speed under existing conditions
must always be determined very largely on how much control
the driver can maintain while driving at such rate." Horsley v.
Robinson, 168 P. 2d, 592, 596, (Utah, 1947).
In Cardon v. Brenchley the Plaintiff appealed the lower court's decision
that there was ng_ cause for action. The defendant's vehicle was
traveling east on 900 South at 7500 West in Salt Lake Citv. The
plaintiff's vehicle made a right hand turn onto 900 South and headed
east in the right hand lane. The plaintiff signaled left and immediately
turned into the left lane which is the lane that the defendant was
traveling. The defendant was traveling at a rate of speed of 70 miles
per hour. When the plaintiff turned onto 900 South the defendant
started slowing and, at the point that the defendant's vehicle collided
with the plaintiff's vehicle, the defendant was going at a rate of speed
of 60 mph.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court in not awarding damages to plaintiff. Phillip Fishier was the
attorney for the defendant. In writing the majority opinion, Justice
Crockett wrote:
"(1) it is true that our statutes provide that driving in excess of
certain stated speeds is prima facie evidence that such speed
is greater than that which is reasonable and prudent under the
circumstance; and it is also true that this may constitute prima
facie evidence of negligence. However, that is not conclusive.
The overriding principle governing negligence is the exercise
of the degree of care which an ordinary, reasonable and
prudent person would exercise under the circumstances."
Cardon v. Brenchley, 575, P. 2d 184, (Utah, 1978).
(Underlining added.)
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The Utah Supreme Court found no negligence on the part of the
defendant even though there had been an accident and that the
defendant was traveling faster than the posted speed,
b.

U.S. 89 through east Layton has normally varies from 76 feet to 90
feet of pavement including 8 foot paved shoulders which are used for
all deceleration and acceleration lanes on the right side of the traffic
lanes. The paved median which varies from 16 feet to 30 feet is used
for left turns.
On that fateful Saturday afternoon, about 2 p.m. the road was
dry and weather was beautiful. The southbound vehicles averaged
about a half-mile apart. The expressway was more like a major
aircraft runway except for the lane striping and an occasional
northbound vehicle.
If there had been an emergency, most travelers could have
traveled safely in excess of 80 mph over this section of road. Any
police officer would not hesitate to go 100 or even 120 mph and often
do in conditions far worse. So what is a reasonable and prudent
speed?
When Sgt. Busch stopped the Appellant the first time on 1-15
in "moderately heavy" traffic (actually a log-jam of about 50 cars) on
a very dark night in February, the Appellant watched him in the
rearview mirror come from 500 feet back in the inside lane of the
three-lane Interstate doing well over 100 mph.

He was passing

vehicles traveling 55 mph in the adjacent lane, as if they were
stopped. Was that safe, reasonable or prudent? The officer thought
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so and so did the lower courts. You must have thought so too when
you refused to answer every issue in Case No. 870464 CA, except
Salina v. Wisden. (If appeal of Case No. 870464-CA was "insufficiently
coherent" as the CA stated, very few citizens have the language or
writing ability to plea for justice pursuant to Utah State Constitution,
Art. I, Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 25, 26 and
27.) (So where do the citizens go to redress grievances?) The police
jeopardize the safety of the public often in the name of safety and
protection of the public. Questions concerning these acts are not
allowed to be asked in the lower courts, because our police are just
"doing their job" by apprehending dastardly criminals.

More

accurately they are "harassing the people and eating of their
substance." (Declaration of Independence.)
7.

A CITIZEN, WHO ACTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND IS NOT A JURISTIC

PERSON, CANNOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF A TRAFFIC INFRACTION (CALLED A CRIME)
WITHOUT THERE BEING A LOSS, DAMAGE, THREAT, TRESPASS, INJURY TO
PROPERTY OR PERSON, SPECIFIC INTENT TO CAUSE HARM AND A COMPLAINT
SIGNED BY THE INJURED PARTY.
a.

In this instant case there were none of the above. There were only
two lonely vehicles 500 feet apart traveling south in the west lane of
a four-lane expressway with two southbound lanes. The nearest
southbound vehicles were at least one-quarter mile ahead and behind.

b.

The prosecutor had no interest in proving intent. Apparently he knew
it wasn't necessary to prove intent because he "lumps" the Citizens
in with juristic corporations who use our public highways for profit and
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gain. Is the proof of intent a necessary condition for establishing that
a crime was committed? Can it be otherwise when it pertains to a
Citizen?
c.

Isn't it true that the court, in order to have jurisdiction, must be able
to affect a remedy? To the Appellant that means reimburse the
damaged person. Who was damaged? To pay any compensation
to an entity who incurred no loss, injury, threat or damage cannot be
considered a remedy.

It could easily be considered ransom or

extortion, but certainly not a remedy because the State had no loss
for which they should be reimbursed. The court and prosecutor
admitted that the State had incurred no loss.
NO CITIZEN SHOULD EVER BE FOUND GUILTY OF A CRIME WHEN
THERE WAS NO CRIME, NO INTENT, NO COMPLAINT SIGNED BY AN
INJURED PARTY AND THERE WAS NO ONE THAT COULD BE
REIMBURSED FOR THEIR LOSS.
8.

THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY

GUARANTEED RIGHT OF CONFRONTING HIS ACCUSER WHEN THE COURTS BELOW
REFUSED TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO INTRODUCE IMPEACHING EVIDENCE OF
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, FALSE SWEARING, PERJURY AND PREJUDICE
ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSER AND ONLY WITNESS.
a.

On the back of the citation (Utah Highway Patrol No. B 143695), Sgt.
Owen Busch made several malicious, inconsistent, false and
misleading statements. (See EXHIBIT "A".)
He estimated the traffic volume as being "moderate" even
though the vehicles in the two southbound lanes averaged at least
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one-quarter mile apart.

He indicated that the Defendant was

"belligerent". The statement was false, prejudicial, immaterial and
irrelevant to the charge.

It was his way of getting back at the

Defendant for a very heated cross-examination of him in the
Farmington Precinct Court a few weeks before where the officer either
avoided answering or lied to keep the facts from getting before the
court on the previous citation. (See EXHIBIT "B".) When a public
servant stops and harasses the sovereign, places him under arrest
for asking questions and drags him from his car, who is the
"belligerent" one?
Sgt. Busch said that the Defendant was traveling at 65 mph
south of the Triangle Station. This is challenged by the Defendant.
The Defendant had set his "cruise" control at 62 mph and his speed
had not varied for the last four miles. South of Hill Field Road, the
officer had pulled up along side the Defendant in the right lane and
about 15 feet back in the so called "blind spot" so that he could
identify the Defendant without being recognized. The Defendant
noticed the little white sports car jockeying beside him but didn't pay
enough attention to it to recognize it was a UHP Mustang.
Sgt. Busch said that the Defendant had refused to show him
his I.D. or license, the Defendant did not refuse to identify himself at
any time. The officer knew exactly who the Defendant was without
question.
The Defendant asked the officer for the "probable cause" for
the stop and also if he was in custody.
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The Defendant was

astonished that Busch would be so aggressive as to stop him or
arrest him falsely, when the first case was being appealed to the
Circuit Court. He knew something that the Defendant didn't know:
That the lower courts would accept an officer's testimony over that
of a citizen, whether it is inconsistent or not. The inconsistencies in
the officer's testimony was ruled as "not before the court". The
Citizens are guilty until they prove themselves innocent, and the
courts will not "put up with" any "sheep" who claim to be Citizens.
And "that's the way it is." (Quoting a prosecutor.)
The officer outright lied on the back of the citation when he
wrote "I had problems the last time I cited this man." The officer that
disobeyed the subpoena would have verified that that statement was
untrue.
When an officer lies, the citizen must not only prove that he
lied, that it was not merely an opinion or exaggeration, but also he
intentionally did so with intent and malice. Otherwise the officer's
testimony will stand and that testimony is sufficient to convict the
Citizen of anything.
Sgt. Busch is the supervisor of the UHP Trooper who did not
show. (See EXHIBIT "C".) I believe they knew the prosecutor and
court would not place any charges against them.

The police,

prosecutor and court work together and each must be a team player.
Only Citizens would be held in contempt for not obeying a subpoena.
The charge that: "He was trying to get me to arrest him" is totally
false. However, the Defendant did ask if he was in "custody."
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The UDOT traffic engineer estimated, since he did not have the
computer print-out for traffic speeds and traffic volumes with him, that
if there were three times the traffic volume ordinarily using the road
on Saturday afternoon; the cars would be over 900 feet apart. This
is in agreement with the Defendant. The sergeant in the UHP with 22
years of traffic service estimated that the traffic was "moderate".
The officer said he followed the Defendant over five miles from
the bottom of Weber Canyon. Why would he do that? Was it to
provide a friendly service or protect the Defendant from highway
hazards? No. He followed the Defendant, after verifying it was the
man he wanted, to harass him.

When he walked up to the

Defendant's vehicle, he said: "I am going to teach you a lesson." He
didn't say what the lesson was, but the Defendant found out later.
In the lower courts his word has 10 times more creditability than that
of any Citizen.
Busch admitted to following the Defendant at a distance of 250 to 300
feet for safety reasons, he said. Actually he was 400 to 500 feet
behind. He also said that he clocked the Defendant for 10 seconds
to make certain the Defendant was traveling at 65 mph. He claimed
to be able to clock the speed within one mile per hour. The one mile
per hour difference, means 1.47 feet per second X10 seconds equals
14.7 feet. Any man, who claims he can follow another moving vehicle
250 feet back for 10 seconds and know that the vehicles are the exact
same distance apart on a highway where there are no stationary
points of reference; is telling a falsehood.
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d.

In the first case, the public record shows that he testified that he
could be in "moderately heavy" traffic conditions (actually in the midst
of a log-jam of 50 vehicles), be in the middle lane of the three-lane
Interstate on a very dark night and adjust his speed, clock a car 300
feet ahead in the inside lane, shoot RADAR to verify his speed; at in
1.5 seconds. The prosecutor and Judge believed him.
The reason the first case was mentioned is that the Defendant
asked Sgt. Busch why it took 10 seconds to clock the Defendant:
"Didn't you testify in a previous court that you could do it in 1-1/2 to
2 seconds." Busch's answer, "No, I did not, nor would I ever." The
court's don't seem to care if the statements the officers make are
reasonable or not, just as long as they get the conviction.

(See

EXHIBIT "D") as submitted to the Circuit Court, Layton Department.
9.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE ARRESTING

OFFICER WROTE IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS ON
THE

COMPLAINT AND BECAUSE THE COURT BELOW

RECEIVED THOSE

PREJUDICIAL, IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT STATEMENTS INTO EVIDENCE.
a.

On the citation described in Issue #8, the officer made eight false,
written statements out of 12 possible. Two statements, (1) there was
"moderate" traffic and (2) "I had problems the last time I cited this
man" are easily proven to be false. In his own testimony he admitted
that the Defendant had not given him any problems, but that he had
given the Defendant problems.
Where the animosity came out was in cross-examination during
the Farmington Precinct Court trial. An attorney said it was the worst
36

courtroom scene he had witnessed in 30 years as a trial attorney.
The written remark was typical of the officer's verbal remarks in
attempting to discredit the Defendant. (See EXHIBIT "B" and Issue
#11.)
b.

The officer used bully and intimidation tactics when giving his citations
and is a master at denying the court the facts in the courtroom.
Since he is the training officer for the newer patrol persons, he is
training them to "get convictions".

c.

If the Appellant understands the legal English used in some of the
Utah State Code, Sgt. Busch is not only not a creditable witness, but
has violated most of the statutes in the Abuse of Office of the Utah
Criminal Code including but not limited to:
U.C.A. 76-8-201 Official Misconduct
U.C.A. 76-8-502 False or Inconsistent Material Statements
U.C.A. 76-8-503 False or Inconsistent Statements
U.C.A. 76-8-504 Written False Statement
U.C.A. 76-8-505 Perjury of False Swearing
U.C.A. 76-8-511 Falsification or Alteration of a Government Record
U.C.A. 76-8-601 Wrongful Commencement of Action in Justice Court
U.C.A. 76-8-602 Assuming Liability for Conferring Jurisdiction Upon
Justice
and Rule 37, Rules of Civil Procedure on Discovery and Testimony

10.

THE

DEFENDANT

WAS

DENIED

DUE

PROCESS

AND

HIS

CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO
CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIS ACCUSER, WHEN THE COURT BELOW
DENIED DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT OF DISCOVERY OF THE OFFICER'S NOTES MADE
AT THE SCENE OF THE ARREST, MADE AT THE MOMENT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CITATION BY THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHILE "IN THE LINE OF DUTY" AND WHILE
ON DUTY.

37

a.

In the Precinct Court, the police used notes that he claimed were
taken at the scene and at the time he arrested the Defendant.
In his "Request for Discovery" Item 5, the Defendant demanded
"Notes and records (copies will be sufficient) made by patrolman,
Badge No. 65 pertaining to the accused and/or the citation"; the
notes were very important to the defense because the officer gave
testimony inconsistent with the facts of the case.
In the Circuit Court, when the officer pulled out his notes, the
Defendant demanded to know why the notes had not been provided
to him. As you can guess, the court ruled that the notes were his
"personal notes" and were not subject to "Discovery" by the
Defendant.

11.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND HIS

CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTTO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIS
ACCUSER WHEN, REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN PROPRIA PERSONA, THE COURT
BELOW WOULD NOT SUSTAIN HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE INAPPROPRIATE,
UNRESPONSIVE AND FLIPPANT ANSWERS ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSING
OFFICER AND THE COURT WAS GENERALLY INTOLERANT AND UNRESPONSIVE TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR HELP IN ASCERTAINING THE TRUTH FROM THE
STATE'S PRINCIPLE AND ONLY WITNESS.
a.

In the Farmington Precinct Court the Defendant was found guilty of
the crime of speeding and in addition, was found guilty of Contempt
of Court for expecting answers to his questions. In the trial de novo,
the Defendant tried in every way to show the court and the prosecutor
that the police officer was not reliable as a witness. That he had
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made false, written statements and perjured himself. His avoidance
of the questions in cross-examination and malicious remarks in place
of them, caused the Defendant to be found in Contempt of Court.
The court flatly stated that the question of whether he was a reliable
witness was not before the court.
The following partial transcript of the Contempt of Court trial
is an example of the typical answers given by Sgt. Busch and the
reaction of the Judges.
BAKER:

"Do you recall specifically two or three questions: 'How
many cars did we pass while you were following me in
the last leg of your clocking me? How many cars
passed us? How many cars did we pass?'"

BUSCH:

"Do I recall what the answer was, or what?"

BAKER:

"Do you recall me asking those questions?"

BUSCH:

"Yes, I do."

BAKER:

"Do you recall how many times I asked those
questions?"

BUSCH:

"Several times over and over."

BAKER:

"Did I ask the Judge (Judge Stewart) to order you to
answer those questions?"
"You asked the Judge a lot of things. You were arguing
with the Judge all the time."

*BUSCH:
BAKER:

"I think you are out of order there. I don't know...."
(Looking to the court for help.)

JUDGE
BEAN:

"Well, the answer is broader than the question."

BAKER:

"I think he ought to limit his answers to the specific..."

JUDGE
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BEAN:

(Interrupting Baker) "Sgt. Busch was.... Did the Judge
(Stewart) ask you to answer a question? ...if you can
go ahead and answer that."

BUSCH:

"I don't recall specifically on which question the Judge
asked me to answer."

JUDGE
BEAN:

"All right, please go ahead, Mr. Baker."

BAKER:

"Did the Judge ever ask you, or order you to answer
a question?"

BUSCH:

"I don't recall specifically whether he did or not."

BAKER:

"You recall he didn't then? Is that correct? Did he tell
me to ask the questions again? Do you recall that
statement?"

BUSCH:

"Yes, he did."

BAKER:

"Was that probably because I didn't get the answers I

*BUSCH:

(Interrupting Baker) "No, it was because you ask
confusing questions, and he wanted you to clarify your
questions and make them clear to me."

BAKER:

"Are you being argumentive at this particular time?"

The questions that were asked several times before Baker asked
Judge Stewart to order Busch to answer were: "In the last mile or so
before you stopped me, how many cars did we pass? How many
cars passed us? Which lane was I in? Which lane were you in?"
Admittedly those are tough questions for a UHP Sgt. to
understand with only 22 years on the force. Baker requested Judge
Stewart to order Busch to answer the questions. The Judge asked
Baker to ask his questions again. Baker did and Busch did again find
the questions confusing and he continued to let the court know what
a trouble-maker Baker was instead of answering the questions. The
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(*) remarks are typical of Busch's answers to Baker's questions. As
Judge Bean pointed out, Busch's answers were "broader than the
question." This was typical of Judge Stewart's attitude also. Baker
thought he had a right to the answers to those specific questions in
the Precinct Court and that is why Judge Stewart found Baker in
Contempt of Court.

When Baker didn't make his answers clear

enough, the Prosecutor and Judge went for his juggler.
12.

THE DEFENDANT, ACTING IN PROPRIA PERSONA, DENIED DUE

PROCESS AND HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN
THE PRECINCT COURT, WHEN HE WAS FOUND GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
FOR MAKING THE DEMAND THAT THE OFFICER ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS. (SEE
EXHIBIT "H".)
a

When the officer avoided answering the Defendant's questions in
cross-examination, the Defendant requested the Judge to order the
officer to answer the question. The officer never failed to answer, but
seldom did the answer pertain to the questions when they were of a
critical nature. The Defendant made similar requests for help from
Judge Stewart three different times during the trial. On this particular
series of questions the Defendant asked the same questions over and
over but failed to receive any legitimate answers. When the Defendant
started over for about the 5th time, the prosecutor jumped up and
said that "The questions had been answered." The Defendant asked
him for the answers so he could continue his questioning. Judge
Stewart asked the Defendant to "settle down," then he added that he
thought the questions had been answered. The Defendant then
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demanded to know the answers. If everyone else knew the officer's
answers, doesn't the Defendant have the right to know them also.
The questions were attempting to establish a foundation for other
questions. He was on trial. Judge Stewart slammed down his gavel
in front of God, the jury, the prosecutor, and incredible witness saying
to the Defendant: "You are in Contempt of Court." The Judge then
asked the jury to leave the courtroom.

He then said that the

Defendant was "In Contempt of Court" and that the Defendant was
fined $50.00.
THE JURY FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY AS CHARGED,
b.

The Contempt of Court charge was appealed to the Layton Circuit
Court along with the speeding charge.
U.C.A. 78-32-1 Acts and Omissions Constituting Contempt
list the acts constituting Contempt of Court. The Defendant is hard
pressed to identify which of the acts he committed. It is quite easy,
however, to assign one or more contemptuous acts to some
witnesses, the complainant, prosecutor and judge.

How is it

disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward a judge to
cross-examine and demand answers from the only witness?
There was no "breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or
violent disturbance" by the Defendant. He didn't misbehave in office
or deceive anyone. He didn't disobey any lawful judgement, order
or process of the court. In fact he tried to use the court process to
put the facts before the judge and jury. He'll probably never know.
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c.

It would seem very strange to an outside observer that in the Circuit
Court trial on Contempt of Court, the prosecution only brought in
Judge Stewart as the witness for the prosecution. The Appellant
subpoenaed Sgt. Busch, three of the four jurors (the Justice Court
didn't have a list of the jurors, only the potential jurors), and Don
Bybee, a witness to the previous trial. (Mr. Bybee's attached letter
will indicate the general attitude of the police officer and the judge in
the first case which didn't change in this case.) The Defendant's
interest was getting the facts before the court. Facts don't seem to
mean much anymore. Falsehoods by our public servants seem to
have far greater weight on the scales of justice.

15.

THE

DEFENDANT

WAS

DENIED

DUE

PROCESS

AND

HIS

CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTTO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIS
ACCUSER WHERE TWO OF THE THREE MATERIAL WITNESSES, WHO ARE ALL
EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE, FAILED TO OBEY LAWFUL SUBPOENAS TO APPEAR AT
THE TRIAL AND THE OTHER WITNESS, WHO DID APPEAR, FAILED TO BRING
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED IN "SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM" WHICH WERE MATERIAL
TO THE DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE, AND WHEN REQUESTED, THE COURT BELOW
REFUSED TO COMPEL THEIR APPEARANCE, HOLD THEM IN CONTEMPT, OR
POSTPONE THE TRIAL (SEE EXHIBIT "C".)
a.

Trooper Lloyd Michaud, Badge #384 of the Utah Highway Patrol was
served with a subpoena by the Davis County Sheriff. He works under
the direct supervision of Sgt. Busch and was with Busch the first time
Busch cited the Defendant. Michaud made no contact before or after
the trial. He failed to obey the subpoena.
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Mr. Robert Todd, P.E. is the Standards Engineer for UDOT Highway
Design Department. Todd was notified about 10 days in advance,
but he wanted the Defendant to pay him $50.00 per hour consulting
fee to testify. After Todd was served the subpoena about three or
four days before the trial, he told the Defendant that Mr. Lee Ford of
the Utah Attorney General's office told him that he was not required
to obey the subpoena because he had not received the witness and
travel fees. The witness and travel fees were delivered the day before
the trial, but he refused to accept them. He was required to bring a
Standard Highway Typical Section which he uses almost daily. Todd's
only hang-up was how much money he would get for a consulting fee
and witness fees were unacceptable.
EXHIBIT "F" is the Defendant's letter to Mr. Paul Warner of
the Utah Attorney General's office concerning Mr. Ford's erroneous
advice.

EXHIBIT "G" is Mr. Warner's letter to the Defendant

"whitewashing" Ford's actions. U.C.A. 21-5-15 (1953 as amended)
states that public servants do not need to be paid witness fees. Why
doesn't the Attorney General know that? Should the Attorney General
be advising the other public servants to ignore subpoenas? Can any
individual legally disobey a legally served subpoena he has received
by refusing to accept the witness fees?
Mr. Blair Marsden, P.E. is a traffic engineer at UDOT in charge of
traffic studies. He was subpoenaed and paid witness fees. He tried
to get out of going because he wanted much higher fees. The data
requested in his "subpoena duces tecum" was available to him by
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computer printout in a very few minutes. The Defendant had picked
up the same data from Marsden's computer operator a month before
in much less than 30 minutes and the Defendant didn't know what to
ask for or what it should look like. Marsden knew exactly what was
requested two weeks before the trial, even though he was served
only three or four days before. He needed the traffic volume and the
speed study at the specific location on U.S. 89. EXHIBIT "E" is the
speed study. If you read Warner's letter, talked to Todd and Marsden,
and checked out the required time it takes Marsden's computer
operator to print out the data, you can see that there is a "whole lot
of lying going on". Knowing our public servants, we should be used
to that.
d.

EXHIBIT "F" is the complaint to the Layton Circuit Court explaining the
problems with the three witnesses and requesting that the court order
them to show cause why they should not be held in Contempt of
Court. Action by the prosecutor and courts against public servants
doesn't happen very often. But then, "That's the way it is."

14.

THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO PAY WITNESS FEES TO A

WITNESS WHO IS A STATE EMPLOYEE AND CALLED DURING BUSINESS HOURS
WHICH REQUIREMENT TO SO PAY WAS REQUESTED BY THE PROSECUTOR AND
ORDERED BY THE JUDGE IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO U.C.A. 21-5-15 (1953 AS
AMENDED).
a.

Sgt. Owen Busch was called to testify as a witness for the defense
in the Contempt of Court trial because he was a witness to the fact.
He is a State employee. He requested the prosecutor, who requested
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the Judge to order the Defendant to pay for all his time spent at the
trial. He submitted his time to the court for reimbursement. The court
and prosecutor seemed very happy about adding that burden to the
Defendant's list of "Got Ya's."
15.

THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO PAY FEES TO

WITNESSES IN A CRIMINAL CONTEMPT TRIAL, WHEN THOSE CALLED WERE
WITNESSES TO THE FACT, AND U.C.A. 21-5-14 (1953 AS AMENDED) IS IN VIOLATION
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
AND OF THE UNITED STATES.
a.

The Defendant has committed no crime.

He has not damaged,

injured, threatened, harmed or in any way trespassed upon another.
He has merely attempted to defend himself in the only way he knows
how against great odds for a trial to be fair, the presence of the
witnesses to the facts is crucial. This whole process is warped and
the only persons who can alleviate the people's burden, are greedy
and/or protecting their bottoms. Maybe the Defendant is a slave and
just doesn't know it.
b.

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says that the Accused
in all criminal prosecutions shall enjoy the right to the compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. If the Accused can't pay
their fees, does that mean he can't have witnesses. Art. I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution says much the same thing. Where does it
say that the government may harass and hassle a citizen for three
years, forcing him to defend himself at his own expense from the
accusations of a known false swearer who is salaried and his legal
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costs to harass the Defendant are supported by our government.
Someone said that if the people who make the rules, or carry them
out, were in the prisons and the prisoners were out; we would be
living with a better class of people.
a

The court furnished to Defendant the subpoenas that were served on
the witnesses of the fact, without any indication to the Defendant that
he would be responsible for their fees.

d

U.C.A. 21-5-14 (1953 as amended) pertains to the creatures, but not
the citizens who have rights and immunities against harassment by
their government and a right to a fair trial.

e.

The Davis County Attorney wrote the Layton Circuit Court requesting
that Mr. Baker be held responsible for the witness and mileage fees
as they applied to witnesses that he subpoenaed and that an order
be entered directing Mr. Baker to pay those fees and expenses. The
trial was on the 13th day of May, 1988, the letter is dated June 14,
1988, but the letter was not mailed until several weeks later. This
document was not timely, but the good Judge Bean decided to handle
the matter as a matter of "housekeeping" against the objections of
timeliness of the Defendant. (See EXHIBIT "I".)

16.

WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT

BELOW DENIED HIS REQUEST FOR "RIGHTS SUA SPONTE"?
a.

Since the Defendant was acting in Propria Persona, and since he is
not trained in the law, he filed a Notice of Demand with the court to
honor, protect and preserve all rights of the Accused.
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The court is required to notify the Accused of any violation of
rights under the Common Law whether enumerated in the State or
U.S. Constitutions; Federal, State or County Statutes; or by any Rules
of Procedure "sua sponte".
That the notification take place prior to the Accused losing
such rights, or violation thereof, in order to protect the Accused's
right from any source.
b.

The judge refused to allow the Defendant to "voir dire" the jury to
determine if they were impartial, prejudiced or a jury of his peers.

c.

The judge pushed the trial on without the benefit of witnesses for the
defense.

d.

The court used no influence to require the arresting officer answer the
specific questions asked of him.

e.

The Defendant was denied a jury trial on the Contempt of Court
charge. The court and the prosecutor insisted that it was a civil
matter when the government attacks a Citizen. The Defendant had
to prove that it was a criminal matter not civil.

f.

The Defendant was denied a friend to come and sit by him during
the trial.

He could have helped to calm the Defendant, listed

questions to be brought out later and even helped cross-examine the
witness.
17.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED

RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN "IMPARTIAL JURY OF HIS PEERS," CONCERNING HIS
RIGHT TO "VOIR DIRE" HIS JURY, WHEN THE COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE
RIGHT TO PERSONALLY ASK THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS QUESTIONS NECESSARY
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TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WERE INDEED IMPARTIAL OR WHETHER THEY
WERE, IN FACT, PREJUDICED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT; IF THEY WERE IN FACT,
PREJUDICED, OR BECAME SO BY STATEMENTS BY THE COURT; AND IF SUCH
JURORS COULD BE DEEMED TO CONSTITUTE A "JURY OF HIS PEERS."
a

The Defendant was not allowed to ask any questions of the
prospective jurors. The Defendant had to ask the Judge the question,
the Judge often revised or changed it and even sometimes refused
to ask it of the prospective jurors.

18.

THE

DEFENDANT

WAS

DENIED

DUE

PROCESS

AND

HIS

CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT BY HAVING TO PAY FOR THE TRIAL
TRANSCRIPTS WHICH HE COULD NOT DO THUS DETRIMENTALLY AFFECTING HIS
RIGHT TO APPEAL
a.

The Defendant was in every sense impecunious with insufficient
money to pay for the transcripts. The Defendant has not found any
regular employment during the last three years.

b.

Art. I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution states: "In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgement, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed."
The Defendant's inability to pay for the trial transcripts
eliminates over 98% of the cases that would ordinarily be appealed.
When 98% of the appealable cases are discharged due the costs of
the transcripts, does that sound like justice is being served? It sounds
much like the injustices perpetrated on the people by the I.R.S.

c.

Since the case is being appealed, the Circuit Court decision is no
longer the final judgement. The final judgement is when the case is
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settled and not in the status of appeal. Our courts are using the cost
of the transcripts to deny justice to those people who have a
legitimate complaint and appeal.
19.

THE DEFENDANT, THROUGH CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND HIS CONTROL

HAS INSUFFICIENT INCOME TO SUPPORT HIMSELF; CANNOT FIND STEADY WORK
WITHIN THE STATE; IS SUPPLIED FOOD AND LODGING BY ANOTHER, AND COULD
NOT POSSIBLY SAVE OR BORROW THE FUNDS TO PAY FOR THE REQUIRED TRIAL
TRANSCRIPTS; THE DEFENDANT MUST BE DEEMED IMPECUNIOUS, WHERE THAT
DETERMINATION WAS BASED SOLELY ON THE MERE FACT THAT HE LIVES IN A
HOUSE AND HAS ACCESS TO A MOTOR VEHICLE. THE HOMELESS AND BEGGARS
ARE NOT THE ONLY INDIVIDUALS THAT CAN BE DEEMED IMPECUNIOUS PURSUANT
TO U.C.A. 21-7-3 (1953 AS AMENDED).
a.

The prosecution provided no evidence supporting their position that
the Defendant was not in impecunious, except that he lived in a house
and had access to a motor vehicle.
Impecuniosity is defined as being without money. It doesn't
mean that he has to be homeless or hungry.

SUBMITTED THIS 19TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1989.
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DON L. BYBEE Being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes
that he has no interest in the case of L. D. BAKER and that he has personal
knowledge of the facts asserted herein and they are true to the best of his
knowledge, infonnation and belief:
1.

I was present in the Courtroom of John Stewart in Farmington

Utah on or about December of 1987 when L.D. Baker was representing himself
on a speeding ticket,
2.

It was my observation that the Utah Highway Patrol seargeant

Oven Bush was conducting the prosecution and making the rulings for the
court on what he would and would not answer on cross examination. He argued
with Mr. Baker and avoided answering direct and clear questions. Each
answer he gave was either a question or an argument. The Judge refused to
order an answer to the questions and in many of the exchanges did not get
involved at all.
3. It wasrayobservation that Mr. Baker was locked in the flow
of traffic and the officer was attempting to claim he "bulled" his way thru
the car which was ahead without that car moving out of the way, or Mr. Baker
changing lanes. The officer claimed to have obtained a radar reading on the
car going the same direction in the middle of a group of cars and refused to
answer how he managed to do that. This in an area now signed for 65 mph.
I told Mr Baker that this was the worst example of injustice or scene I had
seen in 30 years of practice.
Subscribed and sworn before me this 19th day of September, 1989.
JY^ commission expires:

L.D. BAKER
345 West 1600 South
SLC, UT 84115
Judge K. Roger Bean
Layton Circuit Court
437 North Wasatch Drive
Layton, UT 84041
Re: State vs• L.D. Baker, Case No. 87-200-5384
Dear Judge Bean:
On the 13th of May, 1988, a trial was held in the above
court without jusisdiction. At that time, the ACCUSED had
subpoenaed several witnesses that apparently refused to appear
or refused to bring the papers and documents that was subpoenaed.
These refusals had a great bearing on the results of the case.
The following persons refused to appear or did not bring
the documents requested:
Officer Lloyd Michaud, Badge #384, UHP.
50 East State St,
Farmington, UT 84025
No excuses, just didn't show. He was served by the Davis
County Sheriff just a few days before.
Mr. Robert Todd, Standards Engr. UDOT
4501 S. 2700 W.
SLC, UT 84119
Mr. Todd wanted to be paid $50.00 per hour for his time.
When it was explained that all that could be afforded by the
ACCUSED was the $14.00 plus travel, he decided not to come.
He apparently called Mr. Lee Ford, of the Attorneys Generals
Office, who apparently (according to Todd) tod Todd he didnft
have to go to the trial. One of the reasons was that the
witness fee and travel espenses did not accompany the subpoenae.
The fees were delivered to the secratary of Mr. Todd immediately,
the secretary promised to deliver it to him as soon as he was
out of a conference. It is believed that Mr. Todd had seen the
ACCUSED deliver the fees -and refused to accept them so he
wouldn!t have to show up. It is the opinion of the ACCUSED
that the conditions of the service were met by the delivery
of the fees prior to the time of trial.
Mr. Blair Marsden, Traffic Engineer, UDOT
4501 S. 2700 W.
SLC, UT 84119
Mr. Marsdenshow up at the trial, but without on tiny
bit of information that was subpoenaed. The ACCUSED was not
able to overcome the lack of information. Again Mr. Lee Ford
of the Attorney General's Office was responsible, according to
Marsden. According to Mr. Marsden, Ford told him that he could
not take that information to a trial of a private citizen.
Ford told Mr. Marsden to attend but he was not allowed to take
any of the traffic data with him, according to Marsden.

BAKER

87-200-5384

This just three more instances where my government is
attempting to deny the ACCUSED a fair and just trial. The
evidence would have proved Sgt. Owen Busch!s testimony to
be false and inconsistant throughout.
Other than Officer Michaud, the real culprit here is
Mr. Lee Ford. Marsden and Todd called him to get fflegal
adviceM. Instead of providing assistance to the public as
his office requires, he gave them advice on how to thwart
or frustrate the citizen in his endeavor to seek justice
and truth in the court.
believes
The ACCUSED^that the trial lacked the clear cut proof
it would have had if the persons and documents subpoenaed
had been produced. He is hereby requesting the court to call
these witnesses and Mr. Lee Ford because he acted as counsel
for Mr. Todd and Mr. Marsden and denied them taking the
documents subpoenaed; and order them to show cause why they
should not be found in Contempt of Court.
If there are any questions, leave word at 485-3771.
Justice for all,
L.D^ BAKER D
in Propria Persona
P.S,
"Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjucted to the same
rules of conduct that are commands to the Citizens.
In a government of laws, existeanc of the government
will be imperiald if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious
(Miranda v. Arizona, 277 U.S. 438, 485)
All government employee should have to memorize it.

J-XhtOWl
L. D. BAKER

345 West 1600 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
(801) 485-9200

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 87 200 5384
Plaintiff,

Citation No. B143695

vs.

NOTICE AND DEMAND
FOR DISMISSAL
NO RELIABLE WITNESS

L. D. BAKER,
Accused.

COMES NOW the Accused, In Propria Persona, appearing
specially and not generally herein, to move the court to dismiss
the charges as there is no evidence that can be brought before
the court to prove the allegation nor is there a reliable witness
that any unlawful act was committed.
EVIDENCE
There can be no conviction when the state has failed to
establish the prima facia case just as:
"It is also a well-recognized rule that the fact
that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by
the extrajudicial confessions or statements of the
prisoner, and that there must be some evidence or
corroborating circumstances tending to show that a
crime has been committed, aside from such confessions
or statements." State v, Keller, 8 ID 699, 704.
Therefore there must be some sort of evidence that a
crime has been committed other than the statements of the
Accused.
1

The confession of an Accused is not sufficient to establish the
corpus delicti.
Likewise with the prima facia case*

The prima facia

case cannot be proven simply by the accusation of the plaintiff.
There must be some evidence of corroborating circumstances to
prove not only that a crime was committed, but that the Accused
committed said crime.
If the prima facia case held on the single testimony of
an officer, then any charges brought by an officer could not be
refuted.

If this is the state of the law then there can be no

justice for all charges brought forward by an officer are in and
of themselves valid and the accused is simply guilty and should
be punished.

This would mean that our government employees are

in total control of the people and the people have become, in
essence, slaves to their servants.
If the testimony of a single government official is
sufficient to obtain a conviction without any evidence in support
of that testimony, then there is no need to have a judicial
system.

The government official should simply collect a fine,

punish, or exterminate the Accused at the scene of any alleged
crime according to his own judgement.
If law is reason, it is only reasonable that the
Plaintiff must have more than one officer testify or one officer
and some evidence to support the officer's testimony.
WITNESS
The only witness that can be brought forward by the
2

Plaintiff is one single police officer who is not a reliable
witness.

The United States Supreme Court has rules in Briscoe v.

La Hue, 460 U. S.

, that police officers may commit perjury

with total impunity.
In the DECLARATION of INDEPENDENCE, Jefferson listed
among many other injuries the following:
"He has erected a multitude of new offices, and
sent hither swarms of officers to harass the people,
and eat out their substance.ff
ARTICLE 38 of the MAGNA CARTA states:
"No officer, for the future, shall put any man
to his law, upon his own simple affirmation without
credible witness produced for that purpose."
The officer is an interested witness in that his
personal reputation and future success as a police officer are
involved.

Therefore, to benefit himself it would be in his best

interest to perjure himself to maintain a high degree of
credibility among his peers and to make his efficiency appear
greater in the eyes of his superiors.
Since it is in the best interest of the officer to
appear efficient, competent and reliable by his supervisors and
to make him more accepted by his peers, he needs to obtain a
conviction.

Since there are no civil or criminal consequences to

him if he does perjure himself he has nothing to loose.
Therefore, the testimony of the officer cannot be
reliable and must be discarded by the court.
WHEREFORE, the Accused moves the court to dismiss the
charges.

3

Oral argument demanded.

Dated this 18th day of January, 1988.

Respectfully submitted,

L.D. BAKER
In Propria Persona

£XBI6m

i

SIs-JS

STAH

>I K

n,

^»>i t J

:>TOCY

SLU r 4 i^>< Js,T ST 4 I iniM C - U
LAY 1 L >l
I H H
f
MAY

MJUTb OB9

wrATHrft

-CLMR

^^> anu )/

OiFUUIUN
A Rk \

-M„BTH'UJ;M

•

I.J.

7L H I

1 .P»

•M M.i NT 11
r> ACT

u

^-bL.Ut
1

Gf?

n

P P

1, 'C

r
»

!.
IN
» f>f V
iPt 1

it-Ci6
7 1 .'> *

PACt-

7 7 . + J

/. t 7
M t L

f

l "

-7.3/

/Ci

/ ! .

. .

MAXIMUM S ° L J ,)
U , H A N SPL'LU

7i •
')?.

"1 » .
i ~t .

^VhKAOL

.>H._><*

£

' t •

> : .

MfM ^b

JPLLI)

SPF-bL

P LM.F 'ilabJ
> 0 0 .«'»M
>
• '- " P H
Kl
.PH
>

y*

0*

0.0

0*0

l l . l l

• '•!>
, *6

0 .n

«,3."»
'<>.-»

>

L>o •

.

< • 1
•-

M / • t .

Vh

^>b.

j:6

0.
«*
<)•*»

C.11

0.<

VI'

Hi H

1 r.

s/.

<1.l^

MPH
*<PH

t >

J.

/ / •

U#»v

'»•

1

:* •
! t *, V

0

ti#n

*».'»

;> <P*
> r>5

f*)

?•!/
1 JI /

0 .
0-

«!•()

Of>

>

&b-^.6
77,b t

0 .<*

>

.

5t-'
1 )•' 1
7.u»
r
-oS» •

u

i.*>-

Ml f,

nPM

ob.

c >•

. bit

5

' IU«> v

f «*

<5

^0

«* .i<

'1PM

,1Pl-

, j

C»J«H*

a."

/'»

0

CAP j

«).u

X
;>

>
>

6

-Mk U
-PA^LU

b-LtUM;

i

t i .
i<-Cd

< 1 '-'

,

- « > 1 L L T

Lt hL l r I UN
7YH

c^

1

(,A H

* i »> i t-

1YIM

P»

OY

-Yt3
• I d H=ET
-PAIMbi)

I N > r 1. >f L L - Y f ^
M Mi
- < l l i l

,r '

-b<+b

-h
-12 U t T
-M<LD

lu/1

1VH6

» , L I H'> JuM L
blLLY

LANI;>
WIDTH
LUNJiTlLf^

I

MMbLK

IB,

**._>

* •

.

J.

/•
. / .'>
< <>. /

• f

u .«•

14.W

•>•.

;

'

' '• . 1
i J. ^
«

c

.««

i .»

i 4 * 0

^ ,f
IS,^

* / • ' •

0.0
«*.«

^*<#c

o#l

M ,

-1 . » c

S

• J. .
S c .

o.»*

,
. 0

* f •

^ J> * H
Jt

+X1

"^ ^
O.u

* / . /

'

^ / . S

* • i"

u .0

.'

}r>

'»!,

<^

P'\

rl'«itl#-

<•
i<^ <, .

' •
MM . i

• '-.
i«0,<>

J • *.

i ) l . '

<.< « . '

J M I , ,4^

" .^

1 * <7 » <

M

1^0

i> . i t

^>

>O

M >l |

>
>

1 )

i*M

/

1?

.

i.g
•

) . .

M M ,

. »

l «

. 1

4

U'O.

. 0
1

0.1

V

•

CAM Pi I "t
L.D. BAKER
345 W. 1600 S.
SLC
Mr. Paul Warner
> UT
f
Utah Attorney General s Office
Utah State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

84115

Dear Sir:
When I was in your office a week or two ago5 I ask you
to check with Mr. Lee Ford as to his advice to Engineers in
UDOT.
Some charges had been made against me in a traffic situation, which required the help of a UDOT engineer to verify the
conditions. According to Mr. Blair Marsden, a professional
Engineer for UDOT, Mr. Lee told him that the computerized data
accumulated by UDOT was not available to be used in court at
least in this instance. The proper evidence was not introduced
in court and Mr. Marsden gave some opinions that were not
according to their traffic data.
As soon as practical I would like an answer to why Mr. Lee
told Mr. Marsden, he was not to use the UDOT data that was
available to him as the f,keeper of the files".
Mr. Ford also advised a Mr. Todd, the Standards Engineer,
not to submit to the Summons. Is Mr. Ford a servant of the
public? What is his
point in blocking government information being used by the citizens, who paid for it in the first
place.
Thank your for your time, when I visited wir:h you, and
for your investigation of the situation. I would sincerely
appreciate an early response.
Sincerely.

L.D. Baker

£ A tfl |'5j
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Mr. L. D. Baker
345 West 1600 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Dear Mr. Baker:
Thank you for your recent letter wherein you inquired
concerning why Mr. Lee Ford of our office advised engineers in
UDOT not to make certain information available to you for your
traffic violation case. I apologize in taking some time in
replying to you, but I have been out of the office and have only
recently been able to talk with Mr. Ford concerning the matter.
According to Mr. Ford, he informs me that he did in
fact speak with Blair Marsden of UDOT concerning your request for
information records. Mr. Marsden was concerned about the
voluminous nature of the records. According to Mr. Ford, as told
to him by Mr. Marsden, you did not specify with sufficient detail
the information you wanted him to prepare and generally that no
advance arrangements were made. Mr. Marsden therefore did not
know what records to produce and did not have time to research
and compile them. Mr. Ford further indicates that he advised Mr.
Marsden to appear and explain that particular problem to the
court. However, Mr. Ford denies that he advised Mr. Marsden that
the records could not be made available given proper advance
arrangements.
As to Mr. Bob Todd, Mr. Ford recalls that Mr. Todd had
indeed been subpoenaed. However, again no advance notice or
arrangements were made. Mr. Todd was very busy at the time, and
quite frankly did not want to appear. Based on the fact that you
had not included the standard witness fee or mileage check along
with the subpoena, the law does not require one to appear unless
he has been served properly with not only the subpoena but the
witness and mileage fees as well. Mr. Ford suggested to Mr. Todd

2 3 6 STATE CAPITOL

SALT LAKE CITY, l/TAH 8-11 14

TELEPHONE 8 0 l - 5 a 8 - [ 0 l o

Mr. L. D. Baker
June 10, 1988
Page Two
that he contact you directly and explain his reason for not
appearing. Apparently Mr. Todd did not do so.
Mr. Ford is of the opinion, which I also agree, that it
would be proper procedure for you to notify these people in
advance as to what arrangements needed to be made, i.e., when and
where you wanted them to appear, with what specific records you
wanted, as well as appropriate witness and mileage fees to pay
the cost of their appearance. Without proper advance
preparation, it is very common for witnesses to fail to appear.
Finally, based upon my discussions with Mr. Ford, I
find nothing that he did improper. Indeed, I believe that his
advice to the UDOT employees was in actuality proper and correct.
While I recognize that in your opinion this may well have
prejudiced your case, I also believe that if you are determined
to act as your own counsel, you have the responsibility to
ascertain the appropriate and proper way to subpoena witnesses.
Your failure to do so in this particular matter may well have
hurt your case, but I am sure that Mr. Ford acted properly in
advising the UDOT employees as he did. It is entirely likely
that perhaps the information you received from the employees was
not entirely accurate insofar as what advice Mr. Ford had given
them. I hope this information has been helpful to you.
Very truly yours,

,

PAUL M. WARNER
Associate Deputy Attorney General
PMW/sh

L.D. BAKER
345 W. 1600 S.
SLC, UT 84115
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
L.D. BAKER
Defendent/Appellant,

<J
])

CASE No. 87 200 5384
CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE

>
))
'-

BRIEF AND DOCUMENTATION
OF FACTS FOR APPEAL

COMES NOW the Appellant demanding his rights at all
times and not waiving his rights at any time including
his right to time. The Appellant feels strongly that the
following points must be made to correct the file in this
case.
POINT #1
It is important to point out that "if the police officer
had answered the Accusedfs questions, there never would have
been any reason for the charge of 'CONTEMPT OF COURT™. In
fact if the police officer had answered the questions, the
Accused would have been found innocent of the original charge.
The Justice of Peace (Judge Stewart) admitted that I had
requested his help in getting the officer to answer the
questions that were ask. He didn't recall if he directed
the officer to answer or not. In truth the Justice gave
answer
the Accused no help whatever in making the officer/the questions that were ask. My question to the court is: Did the
Accused receive "Due Process", when he is blocked from getting
the evidence before the court?
The officer consistantly in the Justice court avoided
the questions ask and contributed his own biased remarks on
another subject which was often false, misleading or uncomplimentary to me. If the Circuit Court Judge will play back the

BAKER - Contempt trial

minutes of the Contempt hearing where the officer was ask
the question M Do you recall the time in the trial when I
turned to the Prosecutor and ask him TWhat were the answers
to my questions3 so I can continue my questioning'Mthe judge will
find that the officer answered something like "I donft remember,
but I remembered you arguing with the judge.'"

I objected,

but Judge Bean overruled me saying that all the officer said
was that he didn't remember.
When I was cross examined by the prosecutor, he and
Judge Bean jerked me back abruptly, and made^stick to the
questions ask. The Judge may not find th£^ answer the officer
gave was too far out of line, but He will have to admit that
if every question were answered that way, only w±£h^several
minutes of diatribe added to each of my questions, none of
my evidence could have been put before the court, the judge
and the jury would have been confused as to what my point of
evidence was and the court would have been in chaos while
denying me "Due Process".
POINT #2
The testimony of an Attorney with over 30 years as a
'trial Attorney' voluntarily came in to court and testified
that Judge Stewart's Court was in utter chaos. Donald L.
Bybee also testified that the police officer avoided my
questions, gave only the answers he wanted to give, gave
information that did not pertain to the questions ask, argued
with me in the cross-examination and Judge Stewart sat idly
by. Admittedly, Bybee saw my first experience in Judge
Stewart's Court, but the scene didn't change much in the
second trial. My questions were much better, and I requested
help from the Judge more, but the results were the same.
The evidence; that the officer refused to allow the court to
hear.was never heard# The Judge refused to order the officer
to answer the questions that were ask, even though I demanded
that the Judge do so. My demand that the evidence that the

officer was concealing, be brought out in court was answered
by a charge of "Contempt of Court" against me.
The police have been trained to be 'professional witnesses1
They appear to be trained to avoid any questions that would
bring out evidence contrary to their objective, which isnft
always the facts of the case or the truth. Is the object of
the Courts to collect the revenue, or is it the hear the facts
of the case and administer justice?
POINT #3
The Prosecutor with full knowledge of what the officer
was doing, avoiding my questions, contributed to the delinquency of the police officer and the court by allowing the
officer to avoid my questions. My investigation of the ethics
of the Prosecutor, shows that he must "disclose evidence
favorable to defendent". The court and the Prosecutor demand
that I answer the questions put to me honestly and on point.
Is there a another standard for "police officers", or professional witnesses. The Prosecutor knew the the officer was
avoiding my questions and the the Justice Court was in chaos
during my corss-eximination.
POINT # 4
There was testimony from the former jurors, that they had
been sent out of the Court several times. There was no testimony from anyone, even Judge Stewart, that they were sent out
of the room several times so the Judge could chastise me.
The jury was sent from the Courtroom to discuss motions and
jury instructions in addition to the one time that they were
sent from the courtroom after Judge Stewart charged me with
contempt of court. After the jury was sent from the room,
Judge Stewart said again the he found me in contempt of court
and fined me $50.00. Only the one time was there any discussion
of contempt when the jury was out of the courtroom. Does that
prejudice the jury for the Judge to hit his gavel and say the
defendent is in Contempt of Court?

- 3 -
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POINT #5
Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states:
M
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their offices during good
behavior, . . .I!
Was Judge Stewart in ngood behavior11 when he denyed me "Due
Process"? Or when he refused to order the officer to answer
my specific questions? Or when he allowed his court to be
in utter chaos while the defendent was attempting to bring
the facts before the court? Or when he continually allows
the only witness to the "crime" avoid questions put to him
by the defendent? Or when he prejudices the jury by threatening the defendent with the charge of contempt of court,
when the one and only object of the defendent is to bring
the facts in the case out in court so they can be judged?
Or when he slams down the gavel and shouts "You are in
Contempt" to the defendent, when all the defendent has done
is demand the answer to his questions to the police officer?
If the Prosecutor and the court believe that the officer has
answered the defendentfs questions, does the defendent have
the right to know the answers? The answers to the questions
were very simple.
The questions were:
How many cars passed us while you were following
me for the 5 miles?
How many cars did we pass in that 5 miles?
What: lane were you in for the last mile or two?
What: lane was I in the last mile or two?
All of those questions could have been answered by a
number, a right or left lane or by a ! I don't remember1
answer. Even thought those questions were ask at least four
times, the officer avoided giving any answers. He did his
diatribe, giving the jury the idea that he had answered the
questions. Can a citizen be found in Contempt of Court for
asking for the answers to those questions? I was merely trying
to prove the the officer had lied when he marked on the citation
that there was moderate amount of traffic on the road at that

_ 4 -

time, when he knew that there were no cars on the 4-lane
divided expressway going our direction within k mile. This
was only one of the officer's many falsehoods on the citation
and in the trials. Is it denial of MDue ProcessM if the court
refuses to provide to the defendent the facts that the court
has ruled was given by the officer? How can the facts of the
case be brought out if the court rules that the answers were
given and yet no one knows what the answers to thequestions
were? Is the Judge in good behavior if he prevents the facts
proving a falsehood be denied to the jury?
The fact remains that if the police officer had answered
the questions even reasonably, there would not have been any
contempt of court charge against the defendent.
Dated this 27 day of May, 1988.

In propria Persona

- 5 -
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DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY
MELV1N C WILSON
June 14, 1988

Judge K. Roger Bean
Layton Circuit Court
4 37 North Wasatch Drive
Layton, Utah 84041
Re:

State of Utah vs. Lester Baker

Dear Judge Bean:
On the 13th day of May, 1988, a trial was held in the
above entitled matter in your Court. At that time, the defendant
Mr. Baker had subpoenaed several witnesses including Trooper Owen
Bush and the individuals who had served as }ury members in his
trial in the Precinct Court. At that time, a question arose as to
who had the responsibility to pay the witness fees and mileage for
those witnesses subpoenaed by Mr. Baker.
Utah State Code Annotated 21-5-14 (a copy of which is
attached) , provides that no defense witness shall be subpoenaed
at the expense of the State or County unless the Court has so
ordered. In reviewing the file, I do not show that Mr. Baker
ever petitioned the Court or requested the Court for such an
order.
It is, therefore, my opinion that based on this statute
and based on Mr. Baker's failure to file the necessary
affidavits, that Mr. Baker must be held responsible for the
subpoenaed. In this regard, it would be the request of the State
of Utah that an order be entered directing Mr. Baker to pay those
fees and expenses.
If you have any questions, please let me know.
Sincerely,

even J. Major
puty TDavis County Attorney
ic:

L.Baker

